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CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: AN




There is cumulating evidence that Canada, as well as the
United States, faces an unprecedented rise in the cost of health care
delivery.1 In part, this can be explained by recent increases in the
number of complaints about the quality of health care provided by
both physicians and hospitals. This increased number of complaints
translates into a higher frequency of legal claims for medical
malpractice, as well as higher damage awards and settlements, and
consequently, into an increase in the costs of liability insurance for
C
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both physicians and hospitals.2 In Canada, these higher costs of
insurance form part of the negotiations of physician fee structures
under the various provincial health plans.3  Thus, the increasing
costs of medical liability are ultimately borne by all taxpayers in their
general funding of the public health care system.
In light of these developments, it is reasonable to think that
the natural way to control the escalating costs of health care which
are due to medical malpractice is by containing the rise in
malpractice premiums. Hence, in the United States, various state
legislatures have responded by, for example, shortening the statutory
limitation periods, subtracting collateral benefits, imposing restrictions
on plaintiff attorney fees, creating screening panels for malpractice
claims, and reducing the size of damage awards, either by directly
capping the rewards (usually for pain and suffering) or by requiring
periodic rather than lump-sum payments In Canada, there have
been demands for comparable legislative responses.
5
However, it is a mistake to think that higher malpractice
premiums will be the only cost of the increased incidence of medical
malpractice complaints that will show up in higher costs of health
care. There is also to be considered the cost of increased defensive
medicine, or medicine that is practiced largely out of fear of legal
liability. While this cost can also be controlled by legislative devices
designed to reduce the scope of medical malpractice liability,
attention to the cost of defensive medicine suggests yet another
2 See F.J. Sellers, "The Potential Effect of Liability Claims on the Canadian Public Health
Care System: A Need for Legal Reform and/or an Alternative to Litigation for the
Compensation of Persons Disabled Because of Medical Misadventure' in Ontario Task Force
on Insurance, Final Report of the Ontario Task Force on Insurance to the Minister of Financial
Institutions (Toronto: The Task Force, 1986) (Chair. D.W. Slater) Appendix 17 at 355-65;
and D. Duff, "Medical Malpractice and Medical Injuries: Private Law and Public Policy"
(1988) [unpublished], and the references cited therein at 4-6.
3 Sellers, supra, note 2 at 358.
4 For a survey of some of these legislative responses in the U.S., see G.O. Robinson,
"The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective" (1986) 49 Law & Contem.
Prob. 5.
5 See, e.g., Sellers, supra, note 2 at 362; and Canadian Medical Association, "Brief to the
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review of Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care"
(Joint Provincial/FederalTerritorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health
Care, June 1988) [unpublished].
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approach to controlling spiralling health care costs. In particular, it
suggests a closer look at who should properly be the defendant in
the usual medical malpractice action.
In this paper, I shall suggest that our current tort system,
which continues to deem the physician as the primary health care
provider and, therefore, the primary target for malpractice liability,
generates systematic and unnecessary incentives for the practice of
defensive medicine, the costs of which, on some estimates, probably
dwarf any costs of increasing malpractice premiums. 6 I shall argue
that the costs of defensive medicine can more easily be controlled
if the burden of liability for physician malpractice is shifted from
the physician to the hospital, and the standard for liability is changed
from negligence to strict liability. I shall also argue that such a
liability regime will reduce the incidence of medical misadventure,
and be cheaper to administer on a case-by-case basis than our
current system.
Further, strict hospital liability should help to reduce the
unfortunate adversarial nature of our health services system. At the
moment, our overall scheme of health care delivery and responsibility
generates conflicting incentives between physicians and the hospitals
in which these physicians work. While hospitals, now largely immune
from liability for physician negligence because of the independent
contractor rule, 7 strive on limited budgets to contain the increased
costs of health care, physicians attempt to avoid increases in
expected malpractice liability by practicing more and more costly
defensive medicine.8  It is part of my claim that these diverging
incentives can be realigned by moving away from a system of
physician negligence rules towards a regime of strict hospital liability.
Nor is it mere crisis management that should have us
thinking about expanding the scope of hospital liability in Canada.
Gone are the days when a physician was typically called to attend
6 P. Weiler, Legal Policy for Medical Injuries: The Issues, the Options and the Evidence
(January 1988) [unpublished] at 159. See also text accompanying note 54, infra at 544.
7 See section II.B., infra at 531.
8 For an account of the strained relationship that exists between hospital management
and medical staff in the United States that is due in large part to a comparable divergence
in their respective goals, see B.E. Spivey, 'The Relation Between Hospital Management and
Medical Staff Under a Prospective-Payment System" (1984) 310 New Eng. 3. Med. 984.
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to patients in their homes. And increasingly rare are occurrences
when patients go first to their doctor before going to the hospital
merely on the doctor's recommendation. More and more the
hospital, or some comparable institution such as a walk-in clinic, is
looked to by the patient as the primary health care provider, with
the physician a member of its team; and it is increasingly a part of
the patient's reasonable expectation that the hospital or like
institution be a place where the patient can expect not only
competent staff but competent care as well. This reasonable
expectation is further grounding for a system of strict hospital
liability for physician malpractice.
Section II of the paper provides a brief summary of the law
on hospital liability in Canada. It shows how hospital liability for
physician malpractice is currently very restricted. Section III begins
the argument for expanding the scope of hospital liability. It argues,
in particular, that hospital liability should reduce the incidence of
medical misadventures and the costs of defensive medicine. Section
IV goes further and suggests that the standard- of hospital liability
for physician malpractice should be strict liability. Such a standard
is cheaper to administer and, again, avoids the high costs of
defensive medicine. Section V provides for one exception to the
general rule of strict hospital liability. In cases of gross physician
negligence, the hospital should be allowed to have an indemnity
action against the physician. The paper concludes in Section VI.
II. HOSPITAL LIABILITY IN CANADA: THE CURRENT
LAW
In Canada, the civil liability of hospitals for iatrogenic injuries
can be established either directly or indirectly.9 Direct liability is
also referred to as personal or corporate liability; it turns on the
immediate relationship that exists between the hospital and the
patient. Indirect or vicarious liability, on the other hand, is
determined in large part by the kind of relationship that exists
9 E.I. Picard, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada (Toronto: Carswell,
1984) at 299.
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between the hospital and the individual providing the health care to
the patient, for example, the physician or the nurse.
A. Direct Hospital Liability
The ordinary principles of negligence apply as much to
hospitals as to any other person or institution. This means that in
a successful suit against a hospital, a plaintiff must prove, on a
balance of probabilities, first, that the hospital owed him or her a
duty of care; second, that this duty was breached; third, that the
plaintiff thereby suffered a loss; and, fourth, that the hospital's
breach of duty was the cause-in-fact as well as the proximate cause
of his or her injury. The hospital then has all of the usual defences
available to it including, for example, the expiry of any statutory
limitation periods or the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
However, the most critical constituent element of a successful
negligence action against hospitals is the duty of care. Depending
on how expansively this duty is construed with respect to hospital
patients, courts can greatly vary the extent of hospital liability for
negligence.
The most general duty of care a hospital owes to a patient
is the provision of a "safe system" of health care delivery./° Thus,
a hospital will be directly liable for injury to the patient from
inadequate or improperly maintained equipment," or for failure to
provide sufficient personnel to permit adequate rotation of nurses
without danger to patients. 12 Moreover, hospitals are also directly
liable for any failure to hire competent and qualified staff.13  This
follows from the fact that the hospital holds itself out as a place
where patients will be attended to by skilled persons. Thus, the
rationale would equally embrace a hospital's duty to provide systems
10 Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 513 at 558 (Ont.
C.A.), Blair J.A. [hereinafter Yepremian].
11 Vuchar v. Trustees of Toronto General Hospital, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 298 (Ont. C.A.).
12 Laidlaw v. Lions Gate Hospital (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 730 (B.C. S.C.).
13 Magnet, "Corporate Negligence As a Basis for Hospital Liability - A Comment on
Yeprenian v. Scarborough General Hospital" (1979) 6 C.C.L.T. 121 at 124-25.
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of review for the continued competence of its personnel, and to take
any necessary steps to prevent unqualified personnel from continuing
to attend to patients, for example, by withdrawal or restriction of a
physician's privileges in the hospital or by the firing of an employee.
However, the real controversy in discussions of a hospital's
direct liability to its patients concerns whether a hospital is under a
duty not only to provide competent medical staff but also to provide
competent medical care. This distinction might appear to be an
overly nice one, but it is what finally divided the majority from the
minority opinion in Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital,14
now the leading Canadian case on this issue. Here the plaintiff sued
the defendant hospital after a non-employee internist, with hospital
privileges and on call for emergency, failed to diagnose and then
properly treat the plaintiff patient for diabetes. As a result, the
plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and ensuing brain damage. While
there was no doubt that the doctor himself had been negligent, the
action was directed solely against the hospital. At trial, Holland J.
argued that section 41 of the Public Hospitals Actis clearly reflected
"the intention that hospitals be directly responsible to their patients
for the quality of care provided in the hospitals."16 He added that
"the Legislature recognizes the institutional responsibility for care as
opposed simply to a responsibility for providing staff'17 and,
accordingly, found the hospital liable for negligence. Since there was
no evidence that the hospital had been negligent in any way in the
selection and supervision of its staff or in the organization of its
work, critics of the trial decision argued that this trial holding
amounted to a form of strict liability against hospital corporations for
negligent medical treatment occurring on their premises, something
for which there was no prior Canadian legal authority.18
14 Supra, note 10.
15 R.S.O. 1970, c. 378, s. 41, as am. R.S.O. 1980, c. 410, s. 31.
16 (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 175 (Ont. H.C.).
17 Ibid. (emphasis added).
18 See, e.g., Magnet, supra, note 13 at 126.
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Moreover, in reversing the trial court's decision, the majority
of the Ontario Court of Appeal seems to have agreed.19 After
pointing out that no court in Canada had ever before found that a
hospital directly owed a duty to provide proper medical care to a
patient, Arnup J.A. went on:
I agree with the trial judge ... that the Yepremians had every right to expect that
a large public hospital like Scarborough General would provide whatever was
required to treat seriously ill or injured people, but I do not think that it follows
that the public is entitled to add the further expectation: "and if any doctor on the
medical staff makes a negligent mistake, the hospital will pay for it."
Rather, I think a member of the public who knows the facts is entitled to expect
that the hospital has picked its medical staff with great care, has checked out the
credentials of every applicant, has caused the existing staff to make a
recommendation in every individual case, makes no appointment for longer than one
year at a time, and reviews the performance of its staff at regular intervals. Putting
it in layman's language, a prospective patient or his family who know none of the
facts would think: "If I go to Scarborough General, I'll get a good doctor."2 0
Arnup J.A. argued that if direct liability was to be imposed on
hospitals for the negligence of its medical staff, including those not
operating as hospital employees, then such a development should
be properly legislated as a matter of policy rather than created out
of whole cloth by the judiciary adjudicating a particular case.21
However, in a powerful dissent, Blair J.A. admitted the
novelty of the case but argued persuasively that the failure to
expand liability in such a situation also involves the court in a policy
decision: "When confronted with a novel situation, the Court makes
a policy decision whether it decides to expand the area of liability or
refuses to do so. It expresses a view, in either case, as to what
'ought' or 'ought not' to be done."22  As a logical point about
judicial decision-making in a novel case, it is hard to dispute Blair
J.A.'s view.
19 Supra, note 10.
20 Ibid. at 532.
21 Ibid. at 545.
22 Ibid. at 563.
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More significant, however, were the substantive arguments
that Blair J.A. advanced for a hospital's duty to provide non-
negligent medical care:
The recognition of a direct duty of hospitals to provide non-negligent medical
treatment reflects the reality of the relationship between hospitals and the public
in contemporary society. This direct duty arises from profound changes in social
structures and public attitudes relating to medical services and the concomitant
changes in the function of hospitals in providing them. It is obvious that as a result
of these changes the role of hospitals in the delivery of medical services has
expanded. The public increasingly relies on hospitals to provide medical treatment
and, in particular, on emergency services. Hospitals to a growing extent hold out
to the public that they provide such treatment and such services.
"3
Blair J.A. went on to conclude that in the circumstances of
Yepremian, the patient had completely placed himself in the
defendant hospital's hands, relying on the hospital to use its
resources of equipment and skilled personnel to restore his health.
In such a case, the hospital's obligation could not properly be limited
to the provision of a qualified doctor; rather, the hospital assumed,
and would reasonably be expected to assume, complete responsibility
for the patient's ,actual treatment.
Leave was granted to appeal the Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in Yepremian to the Supreme Court of Canada. However,
the defendant hospital agreed to settle the case for just over $1.8
million.24 According to at least one case commentator, the hospital
did this to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment at the Supreme
Court level.25 Certainly the fact that the Supreme Court did not get
a chance to finally rule on the matter, together with the fact that
three of the six judges hearing the case ( the trial judge plus two of
the five Court of Appeal judges) found for the plaintiff, suggests
that the true extent of direct hospital liability for medical malpractice
remains largely unsettled in Canada.
23 Ibid. at 579.
24 Picard, supra, note 9 at 322.
25 Ibid.
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B. Vicarious Hospital Liability
In addition to the liability that attaches to the duties the
hospital owes its patients directly, there is also the possibility that
the hospital will be held vicariously liable for the negligent conduct
of its employees. Indeed, this is the most common basis upon which
a hospital will be held liable to a patient.26 In its most general
form, vicarious liability means that an employer will be liable for the
torts of an employee committed within the scope of his or her
employment, but will not be liable for the torts of an independent
contractor.
It is obvious then that the key issue in this area of liability
is what determines whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor. This is especially important in the hospital
context given the presence of a highly skilled and professional staff
which typically operates (as in large part it should) independently of
any specific directions from the hospital. In an influential, early
English case Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital,27 for example, the
court held that a hospital would be vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of its professional staff while they exercised their
"ministerial or administrative" duties, but not while they were
carrying out their "professional" duties. The reason for the
distinction was the perceived absence of control of the employer
over the professional duties, something which made the professional
staff look more like independent contractors.
Nevertheless, in Gold v. Essex County Council,28 the English
Court of Appeal rejected the distinction between ministerial or
administrative duties and professional duties as unworkable, finding
the hospital liable for the negligence of a radiology technician. Also
discounted was the control test for determining the sorts of
relationships which would ground vicarious liability. Instead, some
sort of master-servant relationship was deemed to be necessary.
Why this might be relevant was made more clear in Cassidy v.
2 6 Ibid. at 313.
27 [1909] 2 K.B. 820.
28 [1942] 2 KB. 293.
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Ministry of Health,29 a case where a hospital was held liable for the
negligence of a house surgeon employed on its permanent staff.
Denning L.J. argued for liability as matter of principle:
... [W]hen hospital authorities undertake to treat a patient, and themselves select
and appoint and employ the professional men and women who are to give the
treatment, then they are responsible for the negligence of those persons in failing
to give proper treatment, no matter whether they are doctors, surgeons, nurses or
anyone else.3 0
He went on to emphasize that it was this power of hospitals to
choose and dismiss employees which justified the application of
vicarious liability even in the absence of any ability to control:
What possible difference in law ... can there be between hospital authorities who
accept a patient for treatment and railway or shipping authorities who accept a
passenger for carriage? None whatever.... The reason why the employers are liable
in such cases is not because they can control the way in which the work is done -
they often have not sufficient knowledge to do so - but because they employ the
staff and have chosen them for the task and have in their hands the ultimate
sanction for good conduct, the power of dismissal.3 1
Whether Denning L.J. thought this liability to dismissal sensibly
distinguished employees from independent contractors was not made
absolutely clear, although Denning L.J. later made certain
observations which indicated that he thought such a distinction
artificial in hospital cases.
32
The real source of the distinction between vicarious hospital
liability and independent contractor liability, at least in the English
cases, now seems to turn on whether the physician, rather than
being provided by the hospital as an integral part of its overall
organization of health care delivery, was engaged directly by the
29 [1951] 2 K.B. 343.
30 Ibid. at 362.
31 Ibid. at 360.
32 Ibid. at 362. Rozovsky has also noted that hospitals have the same powers of sanction
over the independent contractor doctors to whom hospital privileges have been granted as they
do over their employees. See L.E. Rozovsky, 'qhe Hospital's Responsibility for Quality of
Care under English Common Law" (1976) 24 Chitty's LJ. 132 at 133. See also J.B. McHugh,
"Risk Administration in the Marketplace: A Reappraisal of the Independent Contractor Rule"
(1973) 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661. This close analogy between employees and independent
contractors is important for the discussion in section V, infra at 565.
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patient.33 This would explain why in a third English case, Roe v.
Minister of Health,34 the defendant hospital was held vicariously
liable for the negligence of an anaesthetist even though he carried
on a private practice and was only employed by the hospital part-
time. The problem with this as a rationale for vicarious hospital
liability in Canada is that it would suggest the hospital should have
been held vicariously liable on the facts in Yepremian. Yet the
majority of the Court of Appeal rejected vicarious liability in that
case, and the minority seems to have based its findings of hospital
liability on a duty which the hospital directly owed to the patient.35
Thus, in Canada we are still waiting for a systematic and
coherent account of the grounds for vicarious liability that allows us
to make sense of why and when a hospital should be held liable for
the negligent conduct of its personnel. In the remainder of this
paper, I hope to provide the beginnings of such an account. We
shall see that Denning L.J.'s "power of dismissal" serves to imply
hospital liability as much for the misconduct of physicians who are
independent contractors as for the acts of employees in some kind
of master-servant relation. In other words, the analysis to follow
argues for an expansion of vicarious hospital liability, but in a way
that does not depend on the problematic distinction between
independent contractors and employees.
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR HOSPITAL LIABILITY
In this section, I shall argue for an expansion of institutional
liability in the context of medical malpractice. By institutional
liability, I mean a harm-based liability rule36 that targets the
33See Yepremian, note 10 at 574, Blair J.A.
34 [1954] 2 Q.B. 66.
35 See text accompanying note 23, supra at 530.
36 The cumbersome phrase "harm-based liability rule" is used in place of the phrase
"tort rule" to indicate my concession to the view that a proper understanding of tort law
cannot involve the kind of deterrence theory I use in this paper. Deterrence theories, as well
as compensation theories, look upon the fortunes of plaintiff and defendant as separate from
one another, whereas a true tort theory would essentially link each party to the other and give
each equal standing in the private law action. Ernest Weinrib has convincingly argued that
1990]
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institution in which individuals work. In medicine this obviously
suggests the hospital, but there are reasons for also considering other
levels of institutional liability which are intermediate to the hospital
and the individual worker. This might include, for example, the
different departments or sections within the hospital, or even the
various sub-groups of individual hospital staff members deemed to
be in some sort of partnership relationship with one another.
Throughout my discussion, I shall assume that the goal of a
health care liability system is to provide incentives to reduce the
frequency of incidents giving rise to medical misadventure. I take it
as proven that if a liability system were only to provide
compensation for victims of iatrogenic injury, it would be a very
poor compensation system indeed. It seems odd to channel
malpractice compensation through a determination of physician
liability and then, at least in Canada, to have that physician collect
the costs of providing that compensation through fees which are
determined and, ultimately, paid for by the government. Surely a
better system, at least if compensation is the only goal, is to bypass
any determination of physician malpractice altogether, with all its
attendant legal fees, and go directly to some sort of social insurance
plan.3
7
Nevertheless, even if a reduction in the overall frequency of
medical malpractice is the only sensible goal of a liability system,
that goal cannot be pursued without giving due attention to two
other sorts of costs. First, there are the direct costs of avoiding
medical misadventures. Our goal cannot properly be the reduction
of medical malpractice at any price; rather, it must be something
more akin to the optimal reduction of medical malpractice, that is,
reduction to a point where (at the margin: see section III.B below)
such a true theory of tort is to be found in the idea of corrective justice, whereas the theories
of deterrence and compensation are essentially theories of distributive justice, focusing on the
defendant and plaintiff respectively. See, e.g., EJ. Weinrib, "Liberty, Community and
Corrective Justice" (1988) 1 Can. J. L. & Juris. 3. This is also why the scheme of strict
hospital liability that is finally proposed in this paper must be one that is legislated. It is not
a scheme appropriate to discovery within the confines of tort law adjudication.
37 Danzon has estimated that roughly sixty-six cents of every dollar that reaches plaintiffs
as compensation is spent by the parties on litigation. See P.M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice:
Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 4,
187.
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the costs of reducing malpractice cease to be less than the costs of
malpractice itself. Reductions in the possibility of medical
malpractice beyond this point, such as might occur when certain
medical procedures are used defensively or purely out of fear of
legal liability, are simply not worth their costs.
Second, there are the costs of administering to this goal of
an optimally reduced level of medical misadventure. It is also
senseless to achieve savings in the combined costs of medical
malpractice and malpractice avoidance if the costs of achieving this
goal, and maintaining it, are themselves very high. In the current
debate about medical malpractice, this concern for the costs of
administration manifests itself as a concern about the high costs of
litigation, in particular, the high costs of determining medical fault.
38
Even if the fault system finally isolates that standard of medical care
that properly balances the possible costs of medical misadventure
against the costs of avoiding that misadventure, this achievement can
be overshadowed by the high costs of having to adjudicate that
standard of care.
In this section and the next, I shall argue that a proper
attention to all three types of costs, namely, the costs of medical
malpractice occurrences, the costs of avoiding medical malpractice
occurrences, and the costs of administration, argues for a system of
strict hospital liability. The no fault result is by far the most
controversial and radical aspect of my claim and I leave it for
separate treatment in section IV. We shall see there that concern
for the second and third types of costs are primarily what motivates
the strict liability part of my proposal. In this section III, however,
it is the first and second types of costs which lie behind targeting
the hospital in particular.
38 Ibid.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
A. Reducing the Frequency and Costs of Medical Accidents
1. Targeting the Institution
A harm-based liability rule that is designed to provide
incentives to reduce the frequency and, therefore, the costs of
accidents must be based on several key assumptions regarding the
defendant as the target of liability. First, the defendant must have
the capacity to reduce the probability of the accident either by
adjusting the level of care or the level of the activity.39 Adjustments
in care take as given that the defendant is engaged in the activity
and assume that the activity can be performed more safely so that
fewer accidents occur. Adjustments in the level of activity involve
reducing the amount of the activity overall so that even if there is
no change in how carefully the activity is carried on, there will be
fewer accidents as a result. For example, we can reduce the amount
of pollution discharge into the air either by installing more pollution
abatement devices in our factories (a care level response) or by
reducing the number of factories that we have (an activity level
response). In the medical context, it is generally easier to think that
sensible reductions in the frequency of medical misadventure will
come through adjustments in care rather than through reductions in
activity levels.40 It seems more plausible to argue, for example, that
appendectomies should be performed more carefully than to argue
that fewer appendectomies should be performed. However, in cases
where the demand for medical services is more obviously voluntary,
such as in cosmetic surgery, or where there are substitute medical
procedures that are (arguably) less risky, such as in caesarian section
39 The difference between care level and activity level adjustments to avoid accidents is
neatly articulated in A.M. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (Toronto: Little,
Brown, 1983) at 37-49.
40 I emphasize the word sensible here. Clearly, when physicians, out of fear of
malpractice liability, choose not to go into certain specialties (e.g., obstetrics), or choose not
to see certain types of patients or to perform certain kinds of high-risk procedures, these are
all activity level responses. However, these are usually thought to be the kinds of activity level
response we want to avoid. The idea is not to have less medicine because it is dangerous but
rather, less dangerous medicine.
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deliveries, it is arguable that activity level responses to medical
misadventure might be effective.
Second, beyond having the capacity to make some care or
activity level response that is effective against accidents, the
defendant must also have information that some such response is
required. This means that, at a minimum, the defendant must know
that something is wrong. In a sense, this is just a reiteration of the
point that the defendant must have the capacity to adjust either at
the care or activity level. However, an emphasis on the particular
question of information forces us to focus on an issue that is
particularly relevant to the choice between individual and
institutional harm-based liability rules. An individual defendant may
only be the cause of an occasional or single, isolated accident. Such
occurrences may generate no pattern of misadventure which could
possibly suggest to the individual the different kinds of care or
reduced levels of overall activity that might be appropriate.41  An
institution employing many such individuals, on the other hand,
might be able to see a pattern in what to the individuals involved
are isolated occurrences. This pattern of misadventure might argue
for some adjustment in the level of the individual's care or activity
as mandated by the institution. Thus, even if both individuals and
institutions had the capacity to make the requisite adjustments if
they knew something was wrong, only institutions might be in a
position to see that there is something systematically wrong in the
first place.
In addition to spotting systematic (and, therefore, remediable)
misadventure, an institution might also have a large enough statistical
basis to spot the sorts of adjustments to accidents, either at the care
or activity level, that are most appropriate. An individual, on the
other hand, even if he or she believes that the isolated accident
shows that something is amiss, may have no actuarial basis for
41 Cf. P.A. Bell, "Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice:
Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability" (1984) 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 939 at
963: "Insurers are certainly correct in recognizing that most doctors do not have enough
'experience' to permit an actuary to predict with any confidence their expected liability costs."
Compare also Weiler, supra, note 6 at 145: "[O]ne needs a good deal of experience before
one can validly calculate that this particular doctor really is significantly worse than his peers.
A sufficient amount of experience is unlikely to be found in suits against individual doctors
(as opposed to large organizations, such as hospitals)."
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making adjustments away from the status quo in the direction of real
improvement.
Of course, the mere mention of an actuarial basis for
informed judgments about accidents argues that there is a role for
insurance companies and suggests that the distinction between
individuals and institutions as targets for liability might be overdrawn.
After all, individuals are typically insured for liability, especially in
the context of medical malpractice, and surely, insurance companies
can generate the requisite information about systematic misadventure
from their respective insurance pools. However, this reply ignores
the fact that it is better finally to locate the costs of accidents that
are systematically occurring not only on that defendant that can
appreciate that there is something systematic going on (something
which, admittedly, would not distinguish an individual's insurance
company from the individual's institution) but also, on that defendant
which has the technical expertise to make systematic adjustments to
set things right. In the complex medical context, it seems plausible
to argue that this technical ability will be much required and is more
likely to be found within a medical institution than within an
insurance company.
A rough test of these arguments for the comparative
advantage of institutions over individuals to make the requisite
readjustments in the sorts of care they take against accidents can
be conducted by looking at how insurance companies price their
liability insurance. Presumably, if the companies believed that their
different clients could make adjustments in their levels of care, so
that there were fewer liability claims, they would provide those
clients with the incentives to do so in the liability insurance contract.
They would, for example, use deductibles, co-insurance, or
individualized experience rating. Such pricing mechanisms are
commonplace for individual insureds in the motor vehicle context.
However, in the case of physician malpractice insurance, there is
little or no such pricing behaviour by the insurance companies or
the insurance reciprocals involved.42  This suggests that in the
42 Bell, supra, note 41 at 962-63. The Introductory Booklet for New Members 1989 of
the Canadian Medical Protective Association, the association that provides insurance coverage
for the great majority of practicing physicians in Canada, clearly shows that while the
Association charges different insurance premia for different categories of physician according
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judgment of these insurers, there is little real return to focussing
these financial incentives on individual physicians. More likely than
not, this is because the sources of iatrogenic injuries are widespread,
i.e., the momentary lapses of generally competent doctors operating
within a risky environment; therefore, there is nothing to be gained,
and much to be lost in administrative expense, in selectively pricing
against physicians who happen to have higher than average individual
claims experience.
By contrast, insurers of hospitals and other health care
institutions do typically experience rate.43 This is because a hospital
or large institution can have a sufficient number of claims to
constitute a credible actuarial experience on which to base variations
in the price of liability insurance. Thus, in practice the incentives
generated by a harm-based liability system are more likely, through
the pricing of insurance, to be brought home against health care
institutions than they are against individual physicians.
2. What Institution?
A general argument for an institutional rather than individual
harm-based liability rule still leaves open what institution should be
targeted for liability. Even though some 80 percent of all medical
misadventures occur within hospitals, 44 it is not obvious that the
hospital corporation itself represents the only real institutional choice
for liability. Other institutional possibilities include departments or
sections within the hospital (e.g., the anaesthesiology department, the
emergency room, etc.) and any coordinated groups of individual
to actuarial risk (e.g., the highest risk group includes obstetricians and anaesthetists), there
is no attempt to experience rate on a more individualized basis.
43 For example, the Hospital Insurance Reciprocal of Ontario (HIRO) typically offers
differential insurance premia to individual hospitals according to whether they have a Quality
Insurance or Risk Management program in place. I am grateful to David Brisley of the
Ontario Hospital Association for providing me with this information about HIRO.
44 U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: A Framework for Action (1987)
at 22-25.
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hospital physicians who could be thought of as being in something
akin to partnership with one another.
45
Such examples of institutional liability might still preserve a
sufficiently large statistical basis for systematic judgment on the real
sources of some particular kind of iatrogenic injury while at the
same time avoiding the problem of bringing liability incentives to
bear only upon a large and essentially unresponsive bureaucracy. It
is surely arguable that while top hospital administrators might be
good fund raisers, lobbyists, and public relations officers for the
hospital, they have little or no expertise about medical procedures
and the sorts of adjustments that can sensibly be made in particular
treatments to avoid the recurrence of medical misadventures. On
the other hand, what better informed locus of liability can there be,
for example, for the particular difficulties arising in anaesthesiology
than the anaesthesiology department, or the group of individual
anaesthesiologists working together in the hospital? Such a
defendant or group of defendants is "on the scene" in a way that
some administrator is not and, further, has the technical expertise to
judge the sources of complex medical problems and how they might
be remedied.
The problem with these intermediate forms of institutional
liability for the acts of individual hospital physicians arises from the
fact that the institution, as argued above, needs more than just good
statistical information that it is technically competent to judge and
react to if it is to be an effective target for liability. In particular,
it must also have the capacity, meaning not only the practical ability
but also the legal authority, to take action to prevent the conduct
that might produce liability. Thus, for example, if the department
of anaesthesiology discovers a set of better standards and procedures
For discussion of this last possibility, see J.F. Horty & D.M. Mulholland, "The Legal
Status of the Hospital Medical Staff' (1979) 22 St. Louis U. LJ. 485. In Corleto v. Shore
Memorial Hospital, 350 A- 2d 534 (NJ. 1975), plaintiff contended that the physicians on the
medical staff could be sued because they constituted an unincorporated association and,
therefore, each member of staff was responsible for the acts of the others. On a motion to
dismiss, the trial court upheld this contention; however, the plaintiff eventually dropped the
action after a settlement was negotiated with the defendant physicians' insurance company.
For some general discussion of the liability possibilities in targeting some part of a larger
institution rather than the whole institution itself, see C.D. Stone, "Choice of Target and Other
Law Enforcement Variables" in M.L. Friedland, ed., Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal System:
A Multidisciplinary Approach (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
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for the care and effective monitoring of patients under anaesthetic,
they must be in a position to mandate that these new procedures be
adopted and, if necessary, that additional personnel and equipment
be acquired to put the procedures into effect. More importantly,
the department might also have to be in a position to back up its
mandated procedures with threats of dismissal or reduced privileges
for those individual members of departmental staff who fail to
comply. Typically, departmental chiefs do not now have these
powers and, without them, any move towards departmental liability
would be without its cutting edge. Usually, individual members of
staff, including departmental chiefs, sit on credential and/or medical
advisory committees and only have the power to review
appointments and make recommendations to the hospital's governing
board.46  At most, hospital by-laws may also provide that a
departmental chief can temporarily suspend or vary the privileges
of individual members of the medical staff. But the final decision on
appointments or re-appointments, and the permanent reduction or
termination of particular hospital privileges, remains with the
board.
47
In addition to the problems surrounding a lack of final
authority to act against conduct giving rise to liability, there is also
the difficulty that these intermediate institutions might not have
sufficient incentive to act on their expertise even if they did have
that authority. Suppose, for example, that a departmental chief was
targeted for personal liability for medical malpractice occurring
within her department. It is difficult to believe that she would not
insist on the hospital providing some kind of insurance or indemnity
for her against personal liability. Such arrangements are common
for directors within corporations and are thought to be essential if
competent personnel is to be attracted to take on the job.48 Such
arrangements also indicate that the least cost bearer of the risk of
liability is ultimately the corporation whatever the initial liability
46 See "Guidelines for the Appointment of Medical Staff: Parts 1 and 2," Hospital
Trustee, January-February 1985, March-April 1985.
4 7 
ibid.
48 See C.D. Stone's discussion of these arrangements in "The Place of Enterprise Liability
in the Control of Corporate Conduct" (1980) 90 Yale L.J. 1 at 45-56.
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assignment.4 9 However, once hospital corporations and their agents,
or departmental chiefs, can reallocate among themselves the ultimate
risks of adverse legal judgments, one has to wonder what is gained
by targeting some more intermediate level of institutional liability in
the first place. Perhaps the better view is to continue to focus the
incentives of a harm-based liability rule on the whole hospital and
hope that the effect of such liability will be that senior
administrators will become more informed (either directly or by
constant consultation with departmental chiefs) than they currently
are about the systematic medical misadventures that do occur and
how best to avoid them. The prevailing view among physicians that
senior hospital administrators know very little about the technical
aspects of safe health care delivery may simply be a reflection of the
fact that without hospital liability for medical misadventure, they
have little real incentive to become better informed. Competence
tracks liability; indeed, that is the whole point of harm-based liability
rules.
So far the discussion has proceeded as if the choice is to
find some appropriate institutional defendant which is to be
exclusively liable. However, there is a richer array of options if one
recognizes that different defendants can be held jointly liable for the
same negligently caused injury. Indeed, the usual forms of vicarious
liability for employee negligence are of this kind, with the plaintiff
able to sue either the employee or the employer in the first instance,
and the employer typically in a position to recover from the
employee in a subsequent action for indemnity50 Variations on the
vicarious liability rule include allowing actions for contribution rather
than indemnity between the defendants,51 making only one of the
defendants liable to the plaintiff in the first instance but continuing
to allow indemnity and/or contribution, making both defendants
This, at least, is what the Coase theorem suggests. See R.H. Coase, "The Problem of
Social Cost" (1960) 3 J. Law & Econ. 1. Given costless transactions, the parties will transfer
the burden of liability to that party which can bear it most cheaply.
50 The vicarious liability of hospitals, for example, operates this way. See E. Picard,
"The Liability of Hospitals in Common Law Canada" (1981) 26 McGill LJ. 997 at 1019.
51 Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 315, s. 3.
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initially liable but disallowing contribution or indemnity,5 2 or making
only one of the defendants liable and disallowing any sort of
subsequent action for indemnity and contribution (i.e., a kind of
immunity rule for a particular potential defendant). In addition, one
can vary the grounds for indemnity or contribution by, for example,
limiting them to cases of gross rather than mere negligence.
In section V of the paper, I shall argue that hospital liability
should be combined with a physician immunity rule, except in cases
of gross physician negligence where I would allow a hospital
indemnity action against the physician. This aspect of my overall
prescription is motivated by my concerns over the possibility of
excessive precautions being taken by physicians to avoid legal liability
rather than to provide quality health care, the problem of defensive
medicine. It is to a discussion of this important topic which I now
turn. As we shall see, the problem of defensive medicine provides
further argument for hospital rather than physician liability.
B. The Costs of Precautions: Concerns About Defensive Medicine
In section III.A, I argued that the prospect of harm-based
liability is very unlikely to influence, in any sort of productive way,
the care level decisions of individual physicians if most iatrogenic
injuries, viewed from the physician's perspective, are unsystematic
and reflective only of momentary distractions or lapses in attention
to the risks at hand. I suggested that the targeting of institutions,
since they are in a better position to aggregate these seemingly
isolated occurrences into some overall pattern of avoidable
behaviour, is more likely to be conducive to the reduction of medical
injuries. In particular, I claimed that institutional liability at the level
of the hospital, rather than at some lower institutional level, would
generate the incentives to take care at the point where there was
also (sensibly) the required authority to act. While this might mean
targeting a bureaucratic defendant which is furthest from the
complexities of actual on-site health care delivery, I suggested that
liability for health care misadventure might be just what is required
52 The common law rule in Meryweather v. Nixan (1799), 101 E.R. 1337 (KB.).
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to induce these higher levels of hospital administrators to solicit help
and information from those individuals (e.g., physicians) with greater
technical expertise.
However, while individual physicians might not be able to
systematically change their treatments so as to significantly or
efficiently reduce the incidence of medical injury, this is not to say
that they do not continue to worry, and to worry systematically,
about the prospect of legal liability. This, I suggest, influences the
way they practice medicine even if it does not productively influence
the extent to which they cause injury. At issue here is the problem
of wasteful defensive medicine, the sort of medicine that goes to
avoiding legal liability rather than providing quality health care.
53
Estimates of the extent of defensive medicine vary, but a
recent estimate in the United States, using two different
methodologies, put the 1984 cost of the additional component of
medical practice that was due to concerns for tort liability at around
$10 billion, or more than three times the total amount that
American doctors were paying that year for malpractice premiums.
54
Now it is a mistake, of course, to straightforwardly use such
an estimate as a measure of medicine that has little or no
therapeutic value and is only practised out of fear of legal liability.
53
The American Medical Association has characterized defensive medicine in the
following way (as quoted in L.J. Nelson III, "Medical Malpractice and the Transformation in
Health Care Delivery" (1987) 17 Cum. L. Rev. 313 at 338, note 156):
Most defensive medicine - the ordering of additional tests, the
performance of additional procedures, the maintenance of additional
records - will have some value to the patient. It is not, therefore,
unethical. The problem and the waste lie in the fact that these activities
are of only marginal value in most cases, not enough to justify the time
and expense in a world where resources are limited and expensive.
Defensive medicine serves primarily to validate a clinical judgment in
which the physician already has adequate confidence.
54 R.A. Reynolds, J.A. Rizzo & M.L. Gonzalez, The Cost of Medical Professional
Liability' (1987) 257 J.A.M.A. 2776. See also Weiler, supra, note 6 at 157-65. Submissions
made to the Joint Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues
in Health Care (Chair J.R.S. Prichard) suggest that the scope of defensive medicine is likely
to be comparable, on a per capita basis, in Canada. See, for example, C.A. Woodward & W.
Rosser, 'The Impact of Medical/Legal Liability on Patterns of General and Family Practice
in Canada" (Submission to the Joint Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and
Compensation Issues in Health Care, September 1988).
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After all, the whole point of tort liability as a regime of incentives
is to induce changes for the better in health care delivery. Thus,
without some independent argument or statistic that the $10 billion
worth of changes are largely unjustified, it is possible to argue that
the figure is as much a measure of the success of the tort system as
its failure.
55
Nevertheless, without better empirical estimates of the extent
of the problem, I hope to provide theoretical reasons for thinking
that inefficient defensive medicine is a likely consequence of our
current tort regime. Moreover, I shall argue that the problem would
be lessened if hospitals, and not individual physicians, were targeted
for liability. Thus, the problems of defensive medicine, or the
excessive costs of precaution, provide arguments for increasing
hospital liability just as much as our concerns for reducing the costs
of medical injuries themselves. To make precise the nature of this
claim, and my reasons for it, I shall resort to some elementary
economic analysis of negligence law.
1. Three Sorts of Negligence Rule
Over the last twenty years, tort doctrines have increasingly
been explained and advocated on the basis of an economic model of
the deterrent effects of liability judgments.5 6 Defendants are said to
be induced to take optimal care if the failure to do so exposes them
to liability for damages. Optimal care is defined within the economic
theory as that level of precaution which minimizes the sum of
accident costs and accident avoidance costs.
Figure 1 depicts this conventional economic approach to
accident law geometrically. The marginal benefits of adopting
additional precautions to avoid accidents at different levels of
precaution are indicated by the curve MB. Thus, the height of the
This point is recognized by Weiler, supra, note 6 at 159 (contrasting our apparently
negative concerns over defensive medicine with our positive views about defensive driving);
and Bell, supra, note 41 at 971 and at 971, note 144.
56 For recent examples of such analyses, see W.M. Landes & R.M. Posner, The Economic
Structure of Tort Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987) and S. Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Accident Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
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curve MB at a particular precaution level (measured on the
horizontal axis P) is the reduction in expected accident costs, or
harm, that would result from a one unit increase in precaution at
that level. (The curve slopes downward to the right to reflect
decreasing marginal benefits of increased precautions; an additional
x-ray may do some good, for example, but not as much good as the
first x-ray.) The area under the curve MB between one precaution
level and another is the reduction in total expected accident costs
caused by the increase in precautions over that interval. For
example, if precautions were to increase from P1 to P*, the expected
harm would decrease by an amount equal to the sum of the areas
c+d.
The curve labelled MC represents the marginal costs of
taking additional precautions. (This curve has been drawn as flat in
Figure 1, indicating a constant marginal cost for all levels of
precaution; for example, an additional x-ray costs the same as the
first x-ray.) Again, the area under the MC curve between one
precaution level and another is the increase in the total cost of







0 P P* P2  Px Level of
Precaution
Figure 1
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For the economist, the optimal level of precautions is at P*
where the MB and MC curves intersect. For levels of precaution
less than P*, say P1, the marginal benefits of additional precautions
are greater than their marginal costs (indicated by the fact that at all
these points the MB curve lies about the MC curve); so society
would benefit by moving forward towards P*. For levels of
precaution greater than P*, say P2, the marginal benefits of
additional precautions are less than their marginal costs, and society
would correspondingly benefit by moving back to P*.
On the conventional economic theory of negligence, the
defendants are said to have breached their duties of care if they
adopt a level of precaution less than the optimal standard P*. This
much is well settled within the conventional economic theory.
However, there is some ambiguity as to what such negligent
defendants should be liable for under the theory, an issue that goes
to causation.57  Under one approach, a defendant in breach of his
duty of care should be liable only for those accident costs that would
not have occurred had the defendant adopted the optimal level of
precaution P*. This approach might usefully be called the "but for"
causation approach.58 Thus, in Figure 1, a defendant at P1 would
expect to be liable only for the total accident costs that could have
been avoided had the defendant been at P*, or the sum of areas c
+ d. Since this cost is clearly larger than the costs of avoiding these
injuries by moving from P1 to P* (i.e., c + d is larger than d, the
costs of the additional precautions), such a negligence rule clearly
induces the defendant to move to the optimal level of precaution at
P*.
There is, however, a second approach to the causation issue
which also surfaces within the conventional economic theory.
According to this approach, defendants at P1 who fail to adopt the
57 This point, and much of the analysis which follows in this section, is taken from M.F.
Grady, "A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence" (1983) 92 Yale Li. 799 [hereinafter
"Negligence]. For a more recent articulation of the essential ideas, see M.F. Grady,
"Discontinuities and Information Burdens: A Review of The Economic Structure of Tort Law
by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner" (1988) 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 658; and M.F.
Grady, "Untaken Precautions" (1989) 18 J. Leg. Stud. 139 [hereinafter "Untaken Precautions"].
Marcel Kahan has made a similar argument more recently in his "Causation and Incentives
to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule" (1989) 18 J. Leg. Stud. 427.
58 This is Grady's term. See "Negligence," ibid. at, e.g., 804.
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optimal standard of care expose themselves to liability for any harm
that might result, so long as it is of the same kind that more of the
precaution might have prevented. This could be called the "causal-
link" approach.59 Thus, in Figure 1, a defendant at P1 would be
liable not only for c + d but also for e, f, and g. Clearly, this
approach to causation and liability will also induce the defendant to
operate at the optimal standard of care. By doing so, the defendant
has not breached the duty of care and, therefore, any exposure to
liability is avoided.
Thus, although the two different approaches to causation
have very different consequences for an individual who is negligent,
they both create an incentive for an individual to adopt the optimal
care standard. Moreover, in a world where the optimal care
standard is known with perfect certainty, neither approach induces
a defendant to adopt more precautions than those prescribed by the
optimal care standard, since to do so is costly and saves the
defendant nothing in terms of liability for expected harm.
However, in a world where there is uncertainty about the
optimal care standard, in particular, where the potential defendant
is unsure ex ante about what standard of care will be deemed
optimal by the court ex post, the two approaches to causation have
radically different implications for defendant behaviour. Under the
"but for" causation approach, a defendant who operates at P1
thinking that this lower level of precaution is the optimal care
standard can expect to pay c + d in liability for damages if he or
59 Again, this is Grady's term. Ibid. at, e.g., 805. It might seem that courts are obviously
using a moderate version of the "causal link" approach if defendants are held liable for all
negligently caused injuries, even if they are only "more probably than not" (i.e., in just over
50 percent of the cases) the cause of plaintiff's injury; see Blackstock v. Foster, [1958] S.R.
(N.S.W.) 341 (S.C.). However, this is only an evidentiary rule that can be combined with the
"but for" causation rule. On this, see Kahan, supra, note 57 at 441. If the court knew with
certainty that a negligent defendant's conduct did not cause plaintiff's injury, then there would
be no liability under this evidentiary rule and "but for" causation. There could be liability,
however, under the "causal link" rule. Thus, the "causal link" rule holds the negligent
defendant liable if the plaintiff cannot prove actual causation, so long as he can prove on a
balance of probabilities that there is a "causal connection between his injury and the
respondent's negligence"; see McGhee v. National Coal Board, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 at 1017,
Lord Salmon, cited with approval on this point in Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority,
[1988] All E.R. 71 (H.L.). Nelson, supra, note 53 at 334 has suggested that recent American
medical malpractice cases use the "causal link" rule. See, for example, Herskovits v. Group
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 664 P. 2d 474 (1983).
[voL 28 NO. 3
Controlling the Costs of Medical Malpractice
she is wrong and P* is truly the optimal standard. Of course, by
operating at P,, the defendant saves the costs of additional
precautions between Pe and P*. Thus, the net penalty the
defendant pays for the error of underestimating P* at P1 is only c
+ d - d, or c. On the other hand, if the defendant overestimates
the optimal care standard by an equivalent amount by operating at
P2, then the defendant will pay for the costs of additional
precautions, e + f, and save nothing in terms of liability for expected
damages since the defendant would not have been liable for any
damages at the optimal standard P* in any event. Thus,
overestimating P* (at P2) costs the defendant e + f, and equivalently
underestimating it (at P1) costs c. Since c = e (given an equal
magnitude of possible error on either side of the optimal care
standard), the penalty for overestimating P* is greater than the
penalty for equally underestimating it. Thus, under the "but for"
causation approach, we should expect a bias in the direction of
under-precaution.
The opposite is true under the "causal link" approach. The
effect of holding a negligent defendant liable for all the accidents
that result, so long as they are of the same kind that proper
precautions could have prevented, is to create a large discontinuity
at the optimal care standard in the defendant's expected liability
costs. If the defendant overestimates the optimal care standard and
operates at P2, the defendant will pay for the additional costs of
precautions, e + f, that could have been avoided had the defendant
known P* with certainty. On the other hand, if the defendant
makes an error of equal magnitude by underestimating the optimal
care standard and operates at P1, then the defendant's expected
liability is the sum of c + d + f + g. Of course, the defendant
saves the costs of precautions d; so the net penalty for operating at
P1 rather than P* (or the net penalty of underestimating P*) is c +
f + g. Again, given an equal magnitude of error on either side of
the care standard, c = e and, therefore, the penalty for under-
precaution exceeds the penalty for equivalent over-precaution by the
amount g. Thus, under the "causal link" approach, it pays to err on
the side of excess care.
Given these two different behavioural implications under the
two different approaches to causation within the conventional
economic theory, it is obviously important to have some sense of
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how the courts actually operate under the rules of negligence. In
fact, there is good reason for believing that even when the courts do
adopt language that suggests something like an economic approach
to negligence, they are generally not proceeding in the way either of
the above two conventional analyses suggests.60  Rather than
compare what the defendant did as against some optimal care
standard, courts will generally ask whether there was something the
defendant could have done to prevent the accident (causation) for
which the expected benefits exceeded the costs (breach of duty).
While this sounds very much like the conventional economic
approach to negligence, Mark Grady has shown that the implications
for defendant behaviour in a world of imperfect information about
negligence standards are very different.61 In particular, this third
approach, which Grady now calls the "untaken precaution"
approach,62 does not generally induce over- or under-precaution
since, unlike for the conventional rules analysed above, the penalties
for equivalent errors in estimating the optimal standard of care are
symmetric around the standard. Grady's argument for this result will
be spelled out in more detail in section III.B.2.
For the moment, however, it is important to recognize that
there are three different economic analyses of negligence which
generate three very different implications for a defendant's
behaviour. Within the conventional economic theory, which
compares the defendant's conduct with some optimal standard, the
"but for" causation approach systematically induces under-precaution
in a world of uncertain standards; the "causal link" approach provides
incentives for over-precaution. Grady's "untaken precaution" rule,
on the other hand, appears not to generate any such bias at all.
Thus, if all other things are equal, it is arguable that Grady's
approach is the one that courts should adopt; and if it is the one
courts have adopted, as Grady himself suggests, then bias in the level
of precaution taken should not be a significant problem. Our system
of tort liability would be providing appropriate incentives for the
taking of care.
See the discussion of cases in "Negligence," supra, note 57 at 821-29.
61 Ibid. at 817-21.
62 See "Untaken Precautions," supra, note 57.
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Nevertheless, in section I.B.2, I shall argue that the medical
context is different from the general case analysed by Grady. When
one looks at the negligence doctrine in this context, there are
reasons to believe that the courts do use something like the
conventional economic approach rather than Grady's "untaken
precaution" approach. Thus, we should not be complacent about
the possibility of systematic bias in the level of precaution taken by
medical defendants. Moreover, I shall argue that, contrary to the
more general case, the peculiarities of the medical context are such
that all three approaches to negligence systematically generate
excessive levels of precaution by physician defendants. This, I claim,
provides a robust theoretical explanation for defensive medicine. It
also argues, I suggest in section III.B.3, for a system of hospital
rather than physician liability.
2. The Peculiar Context of Medical Negligence
There are at least two reasons for thinking that in the
medical context, the courts are using something akin to the
conventional economic approach to negligence, rather than Grady's
"untaken precaution" approach. First, there is the prominent role
that is played by medical custom in determining the proper standard
of care in medical treatment.63 In most negligence actions, the court
establishes the requisite standard of care for itself and attends to
such concerns as the burden of precautions, the seriousness of the
injury, and the likelihood of injury (all of which are relevant to
notions of economic cost and benefit). However, in medical
malpractice, the court typically allows the medical profession to
establish, by its own customary practice, the standards against which
a defendant's actions should be judged. This deference to medical
custom may just reflect judicial respect for a sister profession. More
likely, it indicates a worry that neither judges nor juries are in as
good a position as doctors to evaluate what is appropriate conduct
63 Weiler, supra, note 6 at 23-28.
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in a highly specialized and scientific area of expertise.64 In any
event; by deferring to custom in this manner, the courts are
essentially comparing the defendant's conduct with a given
exogenously determined standard which they take as optimal.
Depending on their approach to causation, one should expect, on
the arguments provided above, either under- or over-precaution if
there is some uncertainty for the defendant as to exactly what that
standard is.
Second, the medical context has often been one where the
courts have invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for proof of
negligence.65 The onus of proof resting on a plaintiff can be
onerous, especially in those situations where he or she knows very
little about the events leading up to the injury. This will be the
case, for example, when medical mishaps occur during surgery and
the plaintiff patient is under anaesthetic. Clearly, in such situations,
the plaintiff is not in a good position to suggest that some specific
untaken precaution, for which the expected benefits exceed the risk,
could have prevented the injury, the sort of burden the plaintiff
bears under Grady's rule. Rather, the plaintiff will simply assert
that, in the usual course of things, the injury would not have
occurred. This too is an approach that suggests comparison with
some kind of optimal care standard in the manner suggested by the
two more conventional economic approaches to negligence.
Thus, the availability of medical custom as a defence and the
use of res ipsa loquitur as a method of proving negligence suggest
that the courts have adopted an approach to medical negligence that
allows for systematic bias away from the optimum in the level of
precaution taken by defendants. Normally, this bias could be in
either direction, depending on the court's approach to causation.
Nevertheless, I now want to argue that a further peculiarity of the
medical context means that whatever approach to causation is taken,
64 Something more than mere scientific expertise is needed to explain the judicial
deference to custom in medicine but not in other areas of technical complexity. The point
about a sister profession is made by A.M. Linden, "The Negligent Doctor" (1973) 11 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 31 at 33. I suggest yet another reason why courts might defer to custom rather than
use their own cost-benefit approach at the end of section III.B.3., infra at 555.
65 See Weiler, supra, note 6 at 28-30 for an account of new developments in the medical
context concerning res ipsa loquitur.
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a defendant physician's bias will necessarily be in the direction of
excessive precautions.66 Moreover, I shall also argue that this same
bias arises in the medical context under Grady's "untaken precaution"
approach. Thus, all three theories of negligence generate excessive
precautions. In the medical context, this excess is commonly
referred to as defensive medicine.
Consider again Figure 1. Under the "untaken precaution"
approach, a defendant is asked whether there was something extra
that could have been done to avoid the accident for which the
expected benefits exceed the costs. Suppose the defendant was
operating at precaution level P1. Then the plaintiff can point to any
precaution level up to P2 and successfully argue that the defendant's
failure to adopt that additional precaution was a breach of duty.
This is because the area c + d + f (the additional benefits of
moving from P, to P2) is equal to the area d + e + f (the
additional cost of moving from P, to P2); so for any precaution level
just infinitesimally smaller than P2' the benefits will exceed the costs.
No such argument is available to the plaintiff if the defendant
operates at the optimal standard of care P*. Thus, the defendant
has an incentive to adopt the optimal care standard even though the
court need never refer to this standard expressly.
Now suppose that it is difficult for the defendant to estimate
or predict with certainty what this standard will be. In situations
when the defendant must pay for the costs of precautions, the net
penalty for being under-cautious at P, is the additional liability that
the defendant can expect, c + d + f, less the costs of precautions
that the defendant saves, d, that is, c + f. The net penalty for
being equivalently over-cautious at P2 is just the additional cost of
precautions which have no effect on liability, namely, e + f. Since
c = e, there is, therefore, the same penalty for the same amount
of error in under- and over-precaution. Thus, there is no systematic
incentive to take too little or too much care. So far this is simply
Grady's argument in favour of the "untaken precaution" rule over
the conventional economic approaches based on either "but for" or
"causal link" causation.67 If this was how things worked in the
66 Grady makes this point in "Negligence," supra, note 57 at 823.
67 ]bid. at 814-21.
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medical context, we would have some reason to feel content about
the incentives generated by our tort system.
But now suppose that the defendant can recover the specific
costs of additional cost-justified precautions either from the plaintiff
(as a customer) or from some third party. The latter sort of
recovery would be exemplified either by a physician recovering costs
from the government on a fee-for-service basis, or by a physician
directly externalising these additional costs to a hospital. Now the
penalty for operating at P1 is c + d + f since there is no net saving
in the costs of untaken precautions; the defendant would not have
paid for those in any event. Moreover, the penalty for operating at
P2 is only e since the costs for any additional cost-justified
precautions, namely f, are recoverable. (These additional precautions
are cost-justified in the sense that they generate total benefits f
under the curve MB.) Thus, even under the "untaken precaution"
approach, if the defendant can recover the costs of additional cost-
justified precautions, the defendant will tend to be excessively
cautious.
Moreover, under the conventional economic theories of
negligence, both approaches to causation, namely, "but for" causation
and "causal link" causation, will also imply excessive precautions by
the defendant if the defendant can recover the costs of cost-justified
precautions from either the plaintiff or some third party. This
should not be surprising for "causal link" causation since excessive
levels of precautions were already implied by the rule even before
the costs of precautions were assumed to be recoverable. What is
more surprising is that cost recovery completely reverses the
tendency that we observed under "but for" causation for defendants
to err on the side of too little caution.
Nevertheless, the incenfive to be overly cautious is more
circumscribed under "but for" causation than it is under the "untaken
precaution" rule. This is because the penalty under "but for"
causation for erring on the side of too little precaution at P1 is c +
d, or the additional expected liability, whereas the penalty for such
an error under the "untaken precaution" rule is c + d + f. Since
the penalty on the side of too much precaution is the same under
either rule given cost recovery, the net penalty for under-precaution
is greater under the "untaken precaution" rule. Thus, we should
expect a correspondingly greater bias in the direction of excess
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precautions. This might explain further why the courts, at least in
the medical context where physician's costs are either recoverable or
capable of being externalised to hospitals, appear to have adopted
the conventional economic approach of comparing the defendant's
conduct with an optimal care standard.68 When combined with "but
for" causation, such an approach to the breach of duty question
generates the least amount of defensive medicine among all the
physician negligence rules. However, as the argument to follow will
show, we can do even better than this by targeting the hospital
rather than the physician for liability, and by adopting strict liability
rather than negligence as our liability standard.
3. Hospital Liability and Defensive Medicine
There are several reasons for thinking that a move from
physician to hospital liability might reduce the unambiguous bias
towards defensive medicine that we observe under all the physician
negligence rules. First, the arguments in section III.B.2 above were
based on a defendant's recovery of cost-justified precautions. These
arguments do not apply to the extent that hospitals are funded
prospectively according to an anticipated patient workload, 69 and
not (subject to difficult re-negotiations in the budget) according to
the actual costs incurred for the particular services provided. Thus,
we return to the general and varying predictions of the original three
economic models of negligence. In particular, under "but for"
causation, a defendant hospital would tend to be less than optimally
cautious; under "causal link" causation, it would be overly cautious.
Grady's "untaken precaution" rule would generate no bias one way
or the other.
A second reason for thinking that hospital liability might lead
to less bias in the direction of excessive precautions is also related
to the hospital's overall budgeting process. A hospital faced with a
fixed (or, at least, largely non-renegotiable) budget faces the true
See supra, note 64 and accompanying text.
69 This is the Canadian model. See R.G. Evans, Strained Mercy: The Economics of
Canadian Health Care (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) at 174-76; and Rachlins & Kusher,
supra, note 1 at 29.
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opportunity costs of any choice to provide additional services for any
particular patient. This much follows simply from the fact that the
hospital, and not the individual doctor, is the overarching health care
provider, attending to many patients and many different demands on
its resources. Thus, where a physician calling for an additional test
or consultation can externalize the costs of these extra precautions,
either to other doctors (where they might still be recoverable) or to
the hospital (where, at the margin at least, they are not), the
hospital must itself absorb these shifting costs between different
individuals or departments.7" This greater internalization of the
costs of defensive medicine tends to reduce their incidence.
71
Third, and finally, there is the effect of risk aversion. So far,
aversion to risk has played no role in the analysis generating the
tendency towards excess precautions. A risk neutral defendant under
the "causal link" approach to negligence, for example, would still be
excessively cautious. This much simply follows from the fact that the
expected penalty for error on the side of excess precaution is less
than the penalty for equivalent error on the side of too little
precaution. If one adds risk aversion to the equation, however, so
that the defendant is motivated not just by the magnitude of some
expected penalty but also by its variability, then any bias towards
over-precaution is further exaggerated and any bias towards under-
precaution is attenuated. This is because the costs of
underestimating the optimal standard of care is greater liability for
damages, which is variable, whereas the costs of overestimating it are
the costs of excess precaution, which are (largely) fixed. A risk
averse defendant should be more concerned about an equal expected
amount of the former than the latter.
There is reason for believing that individual physicians should
be more risk averse than hospitals with respect to variable liability
for damages. Individuals, who may only face a few instances of
litigation in their careers, cannot pool the risks of litigation and thus,
70 The hospital, therefore, provides us with a version of the "extended firm" solution to
externalities. Coase, supra, note 49 canvasses this as one of the possible solutions to
externality problems when market transactions are relatively costly.
71 It also provides further argument for internalizing the costs of medical malpractice to
the whole hospital corporation rather than sub-units of that institution, the possibility
considered in section III.A.2., supra at 539.
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cannot reduce the variance in its expected costs. Institutions, on the
other hand, can operate much as insurance companies do,
aggregating the offsetting or non-correlated risks of the different
individuals working for them so that the variance in expected costs
of litigation is reduced. Thus, institutions, and in particular hospitals,
will be less risk averse than the individuals working in them with
respect to possible liability for damages. Thus, they should be less
inclined than physicians towards excessive levels of precaution, or in
medical parlance, less prone to defensive medicine.
It will be objected, of course, that since both individual
physicians and hospitals are typically insured against liability, a
difference in risk aversion between the two types of defendant will
have little effect. But this ignores the fact that much of the costs
of tort litigation is uninsured. For both the physician and the
hospital, for example, lost time and lost reputation are also
important costs of the litigation process.72 Without giving some
attention to those uninsured costs, it is hard to think why there
should be anything like defensive medicine in the first place.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR STRICT HOSPITAL LIABILITY
Section III above presented a two-pronged argument for
targeting institutions, in particular hospitals, for liability for physician
negligence. In section III.A, I suggested on the benefit side that
hospitals, unlike individual physicians, would be in a position to
discern patterns of injury-causing behaviour and, unlike insurance
companies and lower level institutions within the hospital, have the
technical expertise, as well as the overall authority, to do something
about them. In section III.B, I tried to reinforce this argument on
the cost side by suggesting that hospitals would have less of an
incentive than individual physicians to engage in the excessive (i.e.,
largely non-therapeutic or only minimally so) precautions that we
commonly refer to as defensive medicine. It now remains to
72 Bell, supra, note 41 provides a more psychological and less economic account of the
deterrent effect of liability judgments in the medical context. Psychological costs are unlikely
to be insured. Indeed, that is a point often made by economists; see, e.g., S.A. Rea,
"Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract" (1982) 11 J. Leg. Stud. 35.
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consider whether the third sort of cost identified at the beginning of
section III, namely, the cost of administering different liability rules,
also favours hospital liability and, if it does, what form that liability
should take. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this is the point at which we
must consider the strict liability alternative. We shall see that not
only does a rule of strict liability save on administration costs, but a
rule of strict hospital liability in particular is the only such rule that
is both cheap to administer and not systematically conducive to bias
away from the optimal standard of care.
By now, we have investigated six different possible rules of
negligence. There are the three rules of negligence that are
identified by the three different economic approaches, namely, "but
for" causation, "causal link" causation, and Grady's "untaken
precaution" rule; and each of the three can be applied to one of
two different defendants, the individual physician or the hospital. I
argued in section III.B.2 that all three rules of negligence generate
excessive levels of precaution when applied to physician defendants,
with "but for" causation being the least costly rule in this respect
and "causal link" causation the most costly.
Interestingly, the costs of litigating each of these negligence
rules is likely to rank them in the reverse order. Most expensive to
litigate is a rule of "but for" causation: Not only must a court
determine the optimal care standard and how well the defendant's
behaviour compares with the standard, but it also has to determine
whether the defendant's breach of the standard was actually the
cause of the plaintiff's injury. This is a very particular causal
determination. "Causal link" litigation, on the other hand, does
much to free itself from judicial determinations of actual cause.
Once the court has determined that there has been a breach of the
optimal standard of care, the defendant is essentially held strictly
liable for all injuries that occur, so long as they are of the kind that
could have been avoided by proper precautions.
Grady's "untaken precaution" rule probably stands somewhere
in between the above two rules with respect to litigation costs. On
the one hand, it should be more expensive under the "untaken
precaution" rule than under either of the other two rules to
determine whether there has been a breach of duty. This is evident
since the courts generally choose to defer to medical custom rather
than investigate the standard of care issue themselves; presumably,
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the courts do this at least in part because it is easier, or less costly,
to leave this matter to the judgment of experts. On the other hand,
like the "causal link" rule, which largely avoids issues of causation,
the "untaken precaution" rule also economizes significantly on the
costs of litigating causation because the plaintiff is free to point to
any untaken precaution that could have avoided the accident that
occurred. The plaintiff's real difficulty will be in proving that the
untaken precaution, which is causally relevant almost by assumption,
should have been undertaken on cost-benefit grounds. This is, of
course, a breach of duty question. Thus, the "untaken precaution"
rule, while it involves relatively expensive judicial determinations as
to whether there has been a breach of duty, is relatively cheap
(perhaps even as cheap as the "causal link" rule) to litigate vis-LI-vis
causation. These speculations on the relative rankings of the three
physician negligence rules, as they concern both the costs of
litigation and the costs of deviations from the optimal standard of
care, are summarized at rows I to 3 in Table 1.
It is interesting to speculate at this point how these different
physician negligence rules might compare with a rule of strict
physician liability. It is certainly tempting to think that strict liability
would be a cheaper rule to litigate in each individual case. After
all, one of the key components of a successful negligence action,
breach of duty, is removed as an issue in the determination of strict
liability. Thus, strict physician liability should be cheaper than all of
the physician negligence rules with respect to the costs of litigating
the breach of duty issue. (I indicate as much in the middle column
of row 7 in Table 1.)
However, the real problem area for a strict liability rule in
the medical context is thought to be causation.73 Unlike a healthy
employee who goes to work or a healthy driver about to get into a
car, the patient who comes to a physician is already sick or injured.
This prior condition, therefore, may be as much the cause of some
subsequent disability as any intervening medical misadventure. This
feature of the medical context is said to make any kind of no fault
or strict liability regime problematic; it will just be too difficult to
73 R.E. Keeton, "Compensation for Medical Accidents" (1973) 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590
at 614: "Perhaps the most troublesome problem facing those who propose to adopt a nonfault
insurance system for medical accidents ... is the causation issue"
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disentangle the consequences of medical intervention from the
consequences flowing from the original condition which necessitated
the intervention in the first place.
Table 1
Costs
A. Over/Under- B. Litigation
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All this may be true, but the real question is whether this
sceptical argument serves to disadvantage in any way a regime of
strict liability as compared to negligence. After all, if the argument
from causation only says that it is difficult in a medical context to
determine what consequence flows from the medical intervention as
opposed to the patient's original condition, then this is as much a
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difficulty for a negligence action as it is for one based on strict
liability. When a negligence action asks whether the injury is the
consequence of some physicians's negligent treatment of the patient,
a strict liability action asks only whether the injury is the result of
that physician's treatment. As already argued, the difference between
the two goes to whether or not the court needs to investigate
whether the treatment was negligent; but the investigation as to
whether medical treatment was even a cause is a feature common to
both types of action. Thus, while litigating the causation issue might
be expensive under a regime of strict physician liability, it is unlikely,
on a case by case basis, to be any cheaper under physician
negligence rules. (I represent this conclusion in the last column of
Table 1.74)
It will be objected, however, that it is wrong to compare the
relative costs of litigation under strict liability and negligence on a
case by case basis only. In particular, the claim will be that the real
costs of a strict liability regime are to be found in the fact that such
a regime generates more litigation even though the costs of litigating
each case might be smaller than for negligence.75 After all, where
a negligence standard leaves the costs of non-negligent conduct to
lie where they fall, a strict liability standard insists on transferring
these costs from the plaintiff to the defendant. A proponent of
strict liability should be able to show some significant advantage in
the move to strict liability if these increased amounts of litigation are
to be justified.
One consideration that does not seem to favour strict
physician liability over any of the negligence rules is the one that
goes to defensive medicine. This should not be surprising. Consider
again Figure 1. Suppose a physician could recover all the costs of
his or her precautions, but was strictly liable for all of the costs of
any misadventure that might occur under treatment regardless of
74 It is, of course, true that if in a negligence action it is certain that there hasn't been
a breach of the duty of care, then there is no point to litigating the issue of causation, and
the costs of litigating that issue are saved as compared to a strict liability action. (This is
essentially the point considered in the next paragraph of the text.) However, negligence cases
that are litigated will likely leave no stone unturned and will tend to litigate the causation
issue as well as breach of duty.
75 Landes & Posner, supra, note 56 at 64-65 have made this point against strict liability.
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fault. Then, surely, the physician would operate at the maximum
precaution level P in Figure 1, thereby reducing all expected liability
to zero and recovering all the costs of precaution. This would be
defensive medicine with a vengeance.
However, it is an implausible result. Rather than reimburse
a physician for all the costs of any procedure, or even the cost-
justified costs of a given procedure, a third party reimburser, such as
the government under a social health insurance plan, is likely to
make its best estimate of the optimal standard of care at a point
beyond which the marginal costs exceed the benefits (i.e., estimate
P* in Figure 1) and fund no additional costs of precautions beyond
that point.76 Then the physician, if able to estimate the marginal
cost and benefit curves correctly, will be induced to operate at P*.
Any level of precaution beyond P* exposes the physician to
unreimbursed costs which are higher than the expected damages for
which the physician is strictly liable.
However, just as for all of the physician negligence rules, we
can resurrect the tendency towards defensive medicine if we
introduce physician uncertainty about the optimal care standard. If
the physician is uncertain about what P* is, then under strict liability,
the cost of underestimating P* at P1 is just the cost of the additional
damages for which the physician will be strictly liable, c + d. (There
are no precaution cost savings in operating at P, since those costs
would be recoverable from the fee for service re-imburser.) The
costs of equally overestimating P* at P2 is e. Thus, the net penalty
for underestimating rather than equally overestimating the optimal
care standard (given that c = e) is d. This is the same as the net
penalty for underestimating one's appropriate precaution level under
Grady's "untaken precaution" rule, and it is larger, and smaller,
respectively, than the penalty for such an error under the "but for"
causation rule and the "causal link" rule. Thus, where strict
physician liability might perform better than a "causal link" physician
negligence rule, it still induces excessive levels of defensive medicine,
which are at least as high as under Grady's "untaken precaution" rule
76 See, for example, the Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 197, s. 24(3)(c) which
allows for a Medical Review Committee to recommend against government reimbursement to
physicians for physician services when such services are "not provided in accordance with
accepted professional services and practice."
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and probably worse than under a "but for" causation rule. It is hard
to conclude, therefore, that there is any strong justification for strict
liability, at least if it applies only to physicians, to be found here.
(I summarize this result in column A of row 7 in Table 1.)
It is now appropriate to consider strict hospital liability for
physician conduct leading to medical injury. We have already argued
that hospital liability for physician negligence attenuates some of the
tendency towards defensive medicine that characterizes all the
physician negligence rules. This was because hospitals tended to be
less risk averse than physicians with respect to liability, and because
hospitals faced a largely fixed budget which forced them to consider
overall interdepartmental costs and which, unlike for individual
physicians, did not allow piecemeal recovery of fees for additional
services from a third party reimburser. Nevertheless, the distorting
effects that Grady first pointed out as problematic for the two
conventional economic approaches to negligence remained and
argued for Grady's "untaken precaution" rule instead. The difficulty
with Grady's rule, as Table 1 serves to remind us (column B of row
6), was that it was relatively expensive to litigate. The question
remains whether a strict hospital liability rule, while it saves on the
administrative expenses of litigation, can also reduce the problem
that continues to plague the cheapest to litigate negligence rule
based on "causal link" causation, namely the problem of excessive
precautions or defensive medicine. If it can, then we will have
isolated a rule which is relatively cheap to litigate on a case by case
basis and which does not generate excessively costly precautions on
the part of defendants. Given the extremely high costs of defensive
medicine,77 the latter form of cost saving would probably more than
justify the higher levels of litigation that would ensue under a strict
liability regime as compared to negligence.
It does appear that a strict hospital liability rule should have
this advantage over a rule providing for hospital liability for physician
negligence. Recall that under the conventional economic approach
to negligence, there was a distortion in the direction of under-
precaution with the "but for" causation rule. The source of this
distortion was that the hospital defendant would pay the costs of
See text accompanying note 54, supra at 544.
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additional precaution beyond the optimal care standard but save
nothing on liability as compared to being at the optimal care
standard. This would systematically induce error on the side of
underestimating the optimal care standard since liability would be
limited to those damages for which the breach was a "but for" cause.
This penalty is smaller than that involved in equally overestimating
the optimal care standard under the rule. Under strict hospital
liability, by contrast, the hospital defendant continues to be liable for
any damages caused by lack of precaution beyond the optimal care
standard. Thus, in contrast to negligence, taking these additional
precautions can avoid this extra liability. This induces the hospital
defendant to consider, at the margin, the relative costs of taking any
additional precautions and the benefits thereby secured in the form
of lower expected liability. Thus, the hospital defendant is induced
to use its best estimate of the optimal care standard rather than bias
itself in favour of under-precaution.
The same kind of argument can be used to show that strict
hospital liability avoids the bias that favoured excessive precautions
under the "causal link" negligence rule. Recall that under this rule
of negligence, the tendency towards excessive precautions arose out
of the fact that any errors on the side of under-precaution exposed
the defendant to liability for all damages that ensued that were of
a kind that additional precautions could have prevented. On the
other hand, over-precaution saved the defendant from any liability
at all. Again, this is simply the sharp discontinuity in damage
liability that characterizes any rule of negligence. Thus, the hospital
defendant in a negligence regime was induced to err on the side of
excessive precaution. However, under strict liability, the hospital
defendant's liability is a continuous function of damages. Thus,
erring on the side of excessive precautions, while it saves on the
liability costs of damages that are actually avoided, does not save on
all liability for damages. Hence, again, the hospital defendant is
induced under strict liability to consider, at the margin, all the
relative costs and benefits of additional precautions and to operate
as near to its best estimate of the optimal care standard as possible.
There is no incentive to practice defensive medicine so as to avoid
liability.
In summary, of all the eight liability rules canvassed above
(namely, the three approaches to negligence each targeting either a
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physician or hospital defendant, plus the two strict liability rules
aimed at the same two defendants), there are only two that do not
introduce some systematic distortion into a defendant's precautionary
behaviour. These are the rule of strict hospital liability and the
"untaken precaution" rule of hospital liability for physician
negligence. However, as evidenced by the judicial deference to
medical custom, the latter rule is relatively expensive to litigate since
it requires the court to determine on a case by case basis whether
there is a specific untaken precaution which could have avoided the
medical accident that actually occurred for which the expected
benefits exceeded the costs. Strict hospital liability avoids the high
costs of litigating such a breach of duty issue while at the same time
not adding significantly to the costs of litigating causation. Thus,
strict hospital liability is the only liability rule of the eight which is
relatively cheap to administer and which avoids systematically biasing
a defendant's choice of precaution level. Under strict hospital
liability, the defendant always does best to operate at its own best
estimate of the optimal standard of care. These different results for
the eight liability rules are all presented in summary form in Table
1.
V. AN EXCEPTION TO STRICT HOSPITAL LIABILITY:
THE CASE OF GROSS PHYSICIAN NEGLIGENCE
It should be apparent that the combined arguments of
sections III and IV are arguments against physician liability as much
as they are arguments in favour of hospital liability. This is
particularly so because so much of the analysis concerned the
problem of defensive medicine, a problem which seemed to be
particularly acute under all the physician liability rules. Thus, while
the arguments above favour a regime of strict hospital liability, they
also argue in general for combining that result with a rule of
physician immunity. Thus, physicians should not be considered as
joint tortfeasors with hospitals, nor should hospitals generally have
rights of indemnity against them. Such add-ons to a regime of strict
hospital liability would only resurrect the problems of defensive
medicine which strict hospital liability was designed initially to avoid.
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Physician immunity from tort liability does not mean, of
course, that physicians need not worry about malpractice even if
they were so disposed. In particular, under strict hospital liability
for medical misadventure, the sanction against the physician for
negligent treatment, as for failure to adopt new risk management
techniques, is likely to take the form of reduced hospital privileges,
or a refusal by the hospital to re-appoint the physician to the
hospital staff. In effect, the hospital operates as a kind of gate
keeper, restricting patient access to physicians who are unwilling or
unable tQ meet the required standard of care.
78
Loss of hospital privileges, of course, imposes a significant
and discontinuous (all or nothing) sanction on physicians, and one
might legitimately wonder whether there is not the same danger
here, as there was under physician negligence, of overly cautious or
defensive behaviour by physicians. However, the difference under
strict hospital liability is that the hospital is as much concerned about
sanctioning a physician who is overly cautious and prone to take
excessive care (and, therefore, expensive for the hospital to have on
staff) as it is about a physician who takes too few precautions and
exposes the hospital to liability for damages. Thus, the physician's
liability to sanction, while admittedly discontinuous in its effect
around the hospital's prescribed standard of care, nevertheless
operates symmetrically around that standard and, therefore, generates
no bias in the physician towards over- or under-precaution.
However, mention of the discontinuous nature of the loss of
privileges sanction that hospitals might impose on physicians suggests
a specific exception to the general rule of having strict hospital
liability combined with physician immunity. Physicians who have
little at stake, or little to gain, by failing to follow their hospital's
prescribed standard of care will tend to follow that standard rather
than risk the high costs of losing their hospital privileges. However,
physicians who have much to gain by failing to follow that standard
might well be prepared to give up their privileges. Alternatively, we
could say that a physician who fails to meet the standard by some
78 The term gatekeeper originates with Reinier Kraakman. See R.H. Kraakman,
"Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls" (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 857 at
888-96; and R.H. Kraakman, "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement
Strategy" (1986) 2 1. L. Econ. & Organization 53.
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small amount, and, therefore, exposes himself or herself to the
hospital's sanction of lost privileges, might as well go on and secure
whatever benefits are thereby secured to a much greater extent by
grossly violating the hospital's standard. Thus, for example, if a
physician is performing unnecessary surgery, thereby exposing
patients to unnecessary risk and the hospital to unjustifiable expense,
the physician might as well do so wantonly, totally, and repeatedly.
Under the hospital sanction, it is as cheap for the physician "to be
hanged for a sheep as a lamb.t 79
This argument suggests that, when they occur in any
systematic way, departures by physicians from the hospital's
prescribed standard of care will be gross rather than trivial, and
intentional (or, possibly, reckless) rather than merely inadvertent.
To prevent this, at least in so far as the problem exists on the side
of grossly deficient precautions, it is useful to impose another
sanction which varies directly and continuously with the additional
expected damages. An indemnity action by the hospital against the
physician for the damages flowing from such gross negligence effects
just this result. It controls the large and intentional departures from
the optimal care standard while not inducing overly cautious
defensive medicine in the more usual cases of ordinary negligence.
One might well wonder why the hospital should continue to
be liable to the patient at all, if the grossly negligent physician is
ultimately going to reimburse the hospital in an indemnity action.
Why not have the patient sue the grossly negligent physician
directly? The answer lies in appreciating that the hospital is better
situated than the patient to judge whether or not the physician is
guilty of gross rather than merely ordinary negligence. If the patient
had to sue the physician directly in such cases, this information
would have to be communicated by the hospital to the patient.
Moreover, since it is a way of avoiding hospital liability, the hospital
would have an incentive to suggest to every patient who was injured
that the physician was grossly negligent. Thus, a direct action by the
patient against the grossly negligent physician would necessitate a
costly transfer of information from the hospital to the patient in a
79 R.D. Cooter has made a comparable argument to explain the need for punitive
damages in tort. See R.D. Cooter, "Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages" (1982) 56 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 79.
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context where such information lacks credibility. A hospital
indemnity action avoids all this by allowing the hospital to act on its
own information as it sees fit.80
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
While the case of Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital
might suggest that the scope of hospital liability for physician
malpractice remains restricted in Canada, the decision to settle that
case before the Supreme Court of Canada had occasion to review
the matter still leaves our law somewhat unsettled. This paper has
argued that there are good reasons for expanding the scope of
hospital liability for physician negligence and even for making the
liability standard one of strict liability.81 Except in cases of gross
physician negligence, where a hospital indemnity action against the
physician should be allowed, strict hospital liability for physician
malpractice targets the defendant who is best able to take action to
avoid the recurrence of the malpractice, and does so without
encouraging overly cautious, and costly, defensive medicine.
82
Doubtless, a call for strict hospital liability for physician
malpractice will appear both radical and impractical. It is radical
because it appears to upset our current tort system in two key
respects. Not only does it shift liability from the physician to the
80
Compare Landes & Posner, supra, note 56 at 206.
81 However, for the reasons referred to in note 36, such an expansion in the scope of
hospital liability should be legislated rather than adjudicated within the confines of a tort
action.
82 At this point, one might well ask why, if the proposed hospital liability regime is so
advantageous, the parties involved have not seen fit to adopt it themselves by way of some
sort of contractual agreement. This is what the Coase theorem suggests should happen; see
supra, note 49. The answer lies in realizing that the substitution of strict liability for
negligence raises the overall costs of medicine, no matter who in particular (physician or
hospital) bears the increased burden. Thus, there is no strict liability contract that can be
written for these two parties that is advantageous to both of them as compared to the prbsent
negligence regime. The proposed strict liability regime is only socially advantageous when all
parties are counted in the calculus, including potential patients. But the transactions costs of
including potential patients in the contract are obviously prohibitively high. Thus, we should
not expect the proposed liability regime to arise contractually. I am grateful to Mark Gillen
for encouraging me to consider this point.
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hospital, but it also replaces the negligence standard with strict
liability. The latter change also suggests why the proposal might be
thought impractical. Under negligence, the costs of non-negligently
caused medical injuries are borne by the patients who suffer them;
under strict liability, these costs are internalized to the health care
delivery system. We constantly hear stories that our health care
system in general, and our hospitals in particular, are over budget
even now under negligence We might well ask how it can be
practical or politically realistic, therefore, to impose further costs on
these institutions by moving to strict liability.
However, we should not overemphasize the radical nature of
a move to strict liability. Under the current physician negligence
regime, we are already whittling away at the fault standard even
while we continue to use fault language. Judicial decisions have
discarded the locality rule,84 expanded res ipsa loquitur,85 and diluted
the cause-in-fact standard. 6  These developments have,
unsystematically to be sure, brought us closer to strict liability than
our fault language might suggest. A forthright legislative change to
strict liability would probably be a less radical change than a
superficial analysis of our current law would suggest. When we
combine this more sophisticated appreciation of our fault system
with the idea in Yepremian that vicarious or direct hospital liability
for physician malpractice remains unsettled, strict hospital liability
also appears to be a less radical proposal.
Nor should we let our concerns for the practical blind us to
the fact that the costs of non-negligently caused medical injuries,
although not borne by our health care delivery system directly, are
nevertheless costs internal to our political system overall. Costs do
not go away because someone or some institution in particular does
83 In September 1988, 117 of Ontario's 222 hospitals were operating in deficit. See
Rachlis & Kusher, supra, note 1 at 30.
84 The "locality rule" (customary medical practice evaluated according to the standards
of a very particular geographical area) was largely undermined in McCormick v. Marcotte
(1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 345 at 347 (S.C.C.).
85 The e xpanded use of res ipsa loquitur is more an American than a Canadian
phenomenon. See supra, note 65.
86 Supra, note 59.
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not bear them. It is a false economy, out of a concern for practical
politics, to resist the move to strict liability just because it allows
hospitals to externalize certain costs from their strained budgets to
society at large.8 7 The more honest approach is to bring these costs
into account within the health care delivery system where they
belong.
87 It is, of course, dangerous to use the language of cost externalization. As Coase,
supra, note 49 taught us, it takes at least two activities to interact and produce costs in their
conflicting desire to use some scarce resource. Thus, these costs are as much the product of
any one activity as the other. Moreover, this Coasian insight helps us assess regimes of strict
liability. It is sometimes argued, for example, that a standard of strict liability is to be
preferred to negligence because strict liability helps to price the liable activity at its true social
costs even if those costs are non-negligently incurred. This is to be encouraged, the argument
goes, because we want to provide the requisite incentives for individuals to move into safer,
or less costly, activities. However, Coase encourages us to recognize that while strict liability
for one of the two interacting activities might correctly price that activity, it fails to bring any
of the costs of the interaction to bear on the second of the two activities. Thus, there is no
incentive to regulate or curtail this latter activity. Some of this problem can be (and
commonly is) covered up with a defence of contributory negligence within a strict liability
regime, but that only burdens the plaintiff at the care, not the activity, level. There is no way
in the context of a tort action (which, in zero sum fashion, only takes from the defendant to
give to the plaintiff) simultaneously to burden both the defendant and the plaintiff at the
activity level. On this, see Green, "On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws" (1976) 7 Bell
J. Econ. 553; and Shavell, supra, note 56 at 29.
Given the above result on reciprocally interacting activities, the argument for strict
liability over negligence reduces to a belief that the defendant is in a better position than the
plaintiff to adjust activity level so as to minimize or (at least) reduce the costs of those
interactions. In the medical context, I think this is a reasonable assumption. In the extreme,
there is little a patient can reasonably do, at either the care or the activity level, to avoid the
costs of malpractice in the treatment of acute appendicitis or the delivery of a child. The
defendant hospital, however, can effectively research into new medical techniques and adopt
safer methods of delivering on the old ones. For a more sceptical view of the possibility of
determining which activity to burden with strict liability, see M.J. Trebilcock, "The Social
Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian
Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis" (1987) 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929 at 987-88; and
also, MJ. Trebilcock, "The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil
Liability Rules" (1988) 4 3. L. Econ. & Organization 243 at 258-63.
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